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FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Civil Society for Accountable Governance Project
Quarterly Report – Year 1
October 2015 – December 2015

DISCLAIMER

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I.   LIST OF ACRONYMS

Acronym	Description
AGO	Attorney General's Office
BSMP	Branding Strategy and Marking Plan
CSAGCS	Civil Society for Accountable Governance and Citizen Security
CICIG	International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (*Spanish acronym Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala)*
COP	Chief of Party
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DCOP	Deputy Chief of Party
DG	Democracy and Governance
FCN	National Convergence Front (*Spanish acronym Frente de Convergencia Nacional)*
GCSS	Global Civil Society Strengthening
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IREX	International Research & Exchanges Board
ISG	Institutional Support Grant
LWA	Leader with Associates
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
Palladium	Palladium International LLC
PODA	Participatory Organizational Development Assessments
RFA	Request for Application
RRF	Rapid Response Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
Y	Year

II.   EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Civil Society for Accountable Governance[1] Project (CSAGCS) is a five-year program financed by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) under the framework of the Global Civil Society Strengthening Leader with Associates (GCSS-LWA) Agreement. The overall goal of the Project is to strengthen and develop the capacity of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Guatemala to play a more effective role in addressing accountability, transparency and anti-corruption related issues. The Project will support and build the capacity of civil society organizations through two complementary and mutually reinforcing objectives: **Objective 1:** Support Targeted CSOs' Efforts to Promote Accountable Governance and Combat Corruption; and **Objective 2:** Strengthen Institutional and Technical Capacity of Targeted CSOs.

This report covers the first quarter (October – December, 2015) of Project Year One (Y1) of the Project's implementation. During this quarter, the Project accomplished important milestones in the administrative startup of the Project, as well as in completing key programmatic deliverables and initiating relationship-building activities. These results include:

Startup:
This first quarter of the Project's implementation was crucial to establishing Counterpart's presence in Guatemala, specifically as it relates to the Project. As such, Counterpart concentrated a significant share of its efforts in setting up its initial operations in country, including: the relocation of its Chief of Party (COP) and completing the first stage of the Project's staff recruitment process, establishing temporary offices, identifying the Project's future permanent workplace, identifying an alternate Deputy Chief Of Party (DCOP) candidate and submitting the paperwork to USAID for approval, and addressing other legal and administrative matters to setup operations in Guatemala.

Relationship-Building/Coordination Activities:
Counterpart began building relationships with its three implementing partners based in the United States of America (USA) to outline a process for completing key deliverables and initiating internal communications. Counterpart met with relevant CSOs and other USAID implementing partners based in Guatemala, in order to ensure efficient and effective project implementation by establishing the foundations for future coordination and to avoid the duplication of programmatic efforts. As a result of these meetings, Counterpart collected the names and contact information of other prospective grantees, which were then incorporated into the CSO Mapping exercise. The Project also gathered information on some of the perceived priorities to address corruption risks in Guatemala (for instance, at the municipal level where local authorities tend to act in an opaque and discretionary manner), which served to inform proposed work plan activities.

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[1] Note that per the Cooperative Agreement - the program's name is the Civil Society for Accountable Governance and Citizen Security (CSAGCS) Program. Upon conversations with USAID as of November 6, 2015, Counterpart was requested by USAID to remove the term "Citizen Security" from the title making the new acronym CSAG; however, until USAID formally modifies the Cooperative Agreement Counterpart must use the full proper name and acronym.

CSO Mapping:
In early December, Counterpart initiated a mapping of CSOs (covering Non-Governmental Organizations – NGOs, private sector foundations, think tanks, universities, media outlets and others) as a preliminary step to filter potential grantees in the target areas of Guatemala City, Villa Nueva, Mixco and Amatitlán. The Project identified 44 prospective CSOs through this exercise during this reporting period (since the end of the reporting period 17 additional CSOs were identified, making the total number of prospective CSOs identified 61), using resources from 1) our new business development team's initial research during the proposal development phase; 2) inputs and recommendations provided by USAID/Guatemala and some of its Democracy and Governance (DG) implementing partners; 3) desk research conducted by our Guatemala team; 4) references from other known international and local CSOs; and 5) references from Project field staff.

The initially identified 44 organizations were sent a questionnaire on December 10 to further understand their institutional, sectoral, and resource capacity (see Annex 3: CSO Mapping Report for further details). Of the 44 organizations, within 3 working days, 20[2] responded to our request for further information and provided answers to the questionnaire.

The CSO mapping process and subsequent questionnaire, allowed Counterpart to classify CSOs as *Leader* or *High Potential* – two qualifications that will determine Counterpart's engagement with the CSOs and level of interventions that will be needed. The CSOs were evaluated against the following criteria: 1) institutional experience on the implementation of good governance and accountability initiatives; 2) impact of implemented initiatives; 3) membership in coalitions/networks of likeminded CSOs; 4) administrative capacities; 5) visibility and references in media (traditional outlets and social media). Each aspect was weighted for a total of 100 points (please see Annex 3 for the score sheet template).

Counterpart considers Leader CSOs as those CSOs that demonstrate significant impact in the areas of transparency, anti-corruption and/or responsive governance. High Potential CSOs, on the other hand, are defined as those CSOs with significant potential for increasing their impact in these areas.

Initial Program Deliverables:
In late November/early December, Counterpart submitted the following documents to USAID: the Annual Work Plan, Gender Equity Strategy, Grants Manual, Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Plan, and Branding Strategy and Marking Plan. To date, these program deliverables are all still under review.

This quarter Counterpart also began to translate the Grants Manual and its attachments into Spanish in anticipation of the approval of the Grants Manual such that we may begin releasing grant request for applications (RFAs).

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[2] While the response rate was quite low, given the short time frame and due to the Holiday Season, Counterpart finds the response of 20 organizations quite a success and anticipates further responses to be coming in January. The final RFA will not be disseminated until early February allowing additional CSO response.

Institutional Analysis:
Counterpart conducted a comprehensive institutional analysis in order to understand the current institutional, political and social context of Guatemala – particularly in relation to the revised political context that gave rise to the newly elected President. The unexpected political context that unfolded over much of 2015, specifically around corruption issues within the government, led to a mobilized citizenry that protested *en masse* against corruption and impunity (see Political Context section for more details). Given that public institutions were widely criticized, Counterpart's institutional analysis reviewed each of the institutions that are key to reforming the state, their association with citizens and civil society, and their level of transparency. The analysis also identifies possible opportunities and risks that may surface in 2016 in connection with the implementation of Project activities (See Appendix 1: Institutional Analysis Report for further details).

III.   POLITICAL CONTEXT

In 2015, Guatemala saw a new political and institutional context emerge. From anti-corruption rallies undertaken by the citizens and criminal cases undertaken showing fraudulent activity in the government, leading to the fall of politicians at the highest levels, including the President of Guatemala Otto Pérez Molina. After Molina's ouster, Guatemala held a Presidential election wherein all candidates were running on platforms of transparency but none more successfully than that of incumbent President Jimmy Morales; an individual with no history or previous experience in politics.

On April 16, 2015, the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG in Spanish) joined forces with the Attorney General's Office (AGO) to disclose the results of their investigation into a criminal structure entrenched in the customs agency (nicknamed *La Linea* in Spanish). Findings indicated that La Linea's fraudulent activity was directed by President Molina and Vice President Baldatti; for the first time in decades, people in Guatemala City and in many of the larger cities throughout the country, came out *en masse* to demand the resignation and criminal prosecution of Molina and Baldetti. This unprecedented massive demonstration and social pressure eventually led to the resignations of both the Vice President (May 8, 2015) and President (September 3, 2015) and led ultimately to Molina and Baldetti's arrest.

As a result of these events, during the first quarter of Project activities, Jimmy Morales, a well-known former television comedian, was elected President of Guatemala on October 25, 2015 with a massive 72% win over his opponent, former First Lady of Guatemala Sandra Torres. Morales' win was somewhat of a surprise to all – including Morales himself – as demonstrated by his lack of a government agenda and lack of a transition team[3]. With a very weak political party structure and using social networks as the bulk of his campaign, Morales achieved a stunning victory. This victory reflects a deep-seated distrust of the country's political establishment by its citizens[4], with voters rejecting candidates – such as Manuel Baldizón from the Renewed Democratic Liberty

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[3] Source: See "Institutional Analysis Report" (Spanish unabridged version) produced for the Civil Society for Accountable Governance and Citizen Security Project.

[4] Alper, Alexandra and Pretel, Enrique. "No joke: Guatemalan comedian wins presidency in landslide". *Reuters.* October 26, 2015. Web. January 25, 2016. < http://www.reuters.com/article/us-guatemala-election-idUSKCN0SJ04G20151026>.

(referred to as Líder in Spanish) Political Party, who led the preferential elections for several months, and former First Lady Torres – that were perceived as representing the "corrupt political class."

Morales is well aware that he swept into office on the up swell of citizen opposition to corruption, yet throughout his entire campaign he did not present an anti-corruption plan with concrete reforms to promote transparency in public spending and government institutions, most likely because of his lack of political experience and of a qualified team of senior advisors[1]. Although his administration will enter into office in January 2016 with significant social legitimacy, early signals point to potential weaknesses in his government and cast doubt on his ability to deliver timely and effective solutions to the major problems facing the country.

Other relevant developments taking place this past quarter included the adoption on November 17, 2015, of Decree 9-2015, which amended the Government Procurement Law. The new provisions intend to bolster the government's electronic procurement system (Guatecompras) and adopt new mechanisms to mitigate corruption risks, including restrictions on sole source awards and the participation of members of Congress, government officials and/or their relatives in government contracts.

On November 30, the National Congress also approved the 2016 budget (Decree 14-2015), which established new mechanisms to foster transparency in government spending. For instance, the approved budget forbids superfluous expenses (e.g. meals and beverages, per diem and representation expenses for the vast majority of government officials), and the budget also requires the Ministry of Finance to draft legal guidelines to manage public grants and subsidies in a transparent and accountable manner. The transition government adopted these measures as a response to the corruption scandals of the Molina-Baldetti administration and to appease social indignation. All of them represent a step forward in the fight against corruption, yet it is imperative for CSOs to both push these initiatives forward and monitor for their effective implementation. In order to support this anti-corruption movement, Counterpart will include these measures as necessary and relevant for CSOs who intend to apply for the Project's first round of Activity Grants.

On January 6, 2016, the AGO announced indictments against former members of the military for human rights abuses and forced disappearances going back to the 1980s. In connection with this investigation, the Attorney General initiated pre-trial procedures against Edgar Ovalle Maldonado, an elected member of Congress and one of President Morales' closest associates (he was identified by the media as his "right hand" man in the President's political party, the Frente de Convergencia Nacional - FCN).[5] President Morales has yet to express a public opinion on this case, although the legal charges place his political party in a precarious situation as Maldonado is the co-founder of FCN. Morales' eventual reaction, particularly if he is perceived to exert any type of pressure on the on-going investigations, could cast doubt on his commitment to the independence of justice systems in Guatemala.

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[5] Véliz, Rodrigo. "La mano derecha de Jimmy: un oficial de operaciones contrainsurgentes." *Nómada*, September 5, 2015. Web. January 25, 2016. <https://nomada.gt/la-mano-derecha-de-jimmy-un-oficial-de-operaciones-contrainsurgentes>.

Under these circumstances, CSOs will be called upon to play a vital role in supplying ideas and know-how for the design and eventual execution of a transparency and accountability agenda in and for the government. Luckily, for some CSOs they have already taken this charge. Under the leadership of the CSO Acción Ciudadana – which conceived and proposed the initiative – the Office of the Comptroller General, the AGO, the Ombudsman, and then candidate Morales signed on October 22 the "National Alliance for Transparency."[6] This document outlines inter-institutional commitments to advance accountability and transparency in government and will likely constitute a preliminary road map for anti-corruption policies under the new administration. It remains to be seen whether Morales' government will fulfill his promise to work hand-in-hand with CSOs in these efforts. However, CSOs can and should mobilize upon the momentum gained by citizens in electing Morales and construct their own agenda to either present to the government or use as a watchdog for potential corruption/non-transparency. Counterpart will be utilizing the Project's Activity grants program to serve as a catalyst to motivate and materialize this agenda.

IV.   ANALYSIS

By and large, during the reporting period, Counterpart International and its implementing partners focused on establishing operations in Guatemala and setting the foundations for the Project's technical implementation.

Counterpart launched all tasks planned for this period, including: completion of the first stage of local team recruitment; initiation of key startup activities:

- Identification of temporary and permanent office locations;
- Submission to USAID of all programmatic documents - the Project's annual work plan, Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (PMEP), Branding Strategy and Marking Plan (BSMP), and Grants Manual;[7]
- Completion of the Institutional Analysis Report (please see Annex 1);
- Launch of the CSO mapping exercise (please see Annex 3 for a final version of the CSO Mapping report completed at the time of writing of this report);
- Launch of quarterly program coordination meetings with Counterpart's three institutional partners: IREX, IFES, and Palladium[8].

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[6] Gularte, William. "Firman acuerdo para controlar uso de fondos públicos". *El Periódico.* October 23, 2015. Web. January 25, 2016. <http://elperiodico.com.gt/2015/10/23/pais/firman-acuerdo-para-controlar-uso-de-fondos-publicos/.>
[7] All pending USAID approval.
[8] Since the official submission of Counterpart's proposal, one of the Project's subpartners Development and Training Services (dTS) was incorporated by Palladium Corporation. As such the Project and all of Counterpart's subaward mechanisms dealing with dTS will now be renamed to Palladium.

V. SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES

General Activities

Startup Tasks:
On the administrative front, Counterpart concentrated a significant share of its efforts in setting up its initial operations in country. This startup involved completing the relocation of its COP and the first stage of the Project's staff recruitment process, establishing temporary offices, identifying the Project's future permanent venue, identifying an alternate DCOP candidate and submitting this person to USAID for review, and addressing other legal and administrative matters to setup operations in Guatemala (e.g. processing legal mandates, residency permissions, lease and services contracts, etc.). Additionally, Counterpart held initial coordination meetings with its three implementing partners to outline a process for completing key deliverables and initiating internal communications.

In terms of partner staffing, all three partners spent the last quarter recruiting heavily for the Social Audit, Media Communications, and Gender specialists' positions, but at the end of December had not yet found suitable candidates. All partners anticipate identifying a candidate in January so that the individual is on-board sometime in February.

The following is a list of other administrative tasks that Counterpart addressed during the first quarter of activities:

- Trained local staff on Counterpart International's standard regulations and policies.
- Completed the process to generate VAT exemptions for local vendors.
- Procured computer equipment and initiated the process for shipment to Guatemala.
- Completed contract templates for COP's home and office lease.
- Drafted labor contracts.
- Initiated the process to open bank accounts.
- Created an RFQ for project vehicles.

Program Deliverables:
In late November/early December Counterpart submitted all deliverables scheduled for this period to USAID. These products were: Annual Work Plan, Gender Equity Strategy, Grants Manual, PMEP, and BSMP. To date, these program deliverables are still under review and negotiation with USAID for final approvals.

Institutional Analysis:
This quarter, Counterpart conducted a comprehensive institutional analysis in order to provide a snapshot of the current institutional, political and social context in Guatemala and to inform Year 1 Work Plan design activities. The unexpected political context that unfolded over much of 2015, as discussed in the Political Context section of this report, specifically around corruption issues within the government, led to a mobilized citizenry that protested *en masse* against corruption and impunity. Given that public institutions were widely criticized during those events, Counterpart's institutional analysis reviewed each of the institutions that are key to reforming the state. The document also identifies possible opportunities and risks that may surface in 2016 in connection

with the implementation of Project activities. For instance, the report identifies the anticipated role and influence of local think tanks such as the School of Government (Cayalá), San Carlos University and other centers from Rafael Landívar University and the Latin American School of Social Sciences (FLACSO), which are expected to associate themselves with social movements to influence local and national government, as well as Congress.

Project Objective One: Support Targeted CSOs' Efforts to Promote Accountable Governance and Combat Corruption

Result 1.1 – Increased number of CSO that can effectively conduct advocacy for reform processes and the monitoring and auditing of state performance and compliance

Result 1.1 Milestones/Timelines:
1. CSO Mapping – December/January, 2015
2. Phase 1 Grantees Selection – January - March 2016

1.1.a CSO Prospective Grantee Mapping
In early December, Counterpart initiated a mapping of prospective CSOs (covering NGOs, private sector foundations, think tanks, universities, media outlets and others) as a preliminary step to filter potential grantees in the target areas of Guatemala City, Villa Nueva, Mixco and Amatitlán. The mapping exercise was a two-step process involving first the identification of potential CSOs and second requesting technical and administrative information of identified CSOs using a written questionnaire.

The Project identified 44 prospective CSOs through this exercise, using resources from 1) our new business development team's initial research during the proposal development; 2) inputs and recommendations provided by USAID/Guatemala and some of its Democracy and Governance (DG) implementing partners; 3) desk research conducted by our Guatemala team; 4) references from other known international and local CSOs; and 5) staff Expertise/In-House Knowledge. These 44 CSOs were identified[9] as having: 1) a clear mission, and 2) proven institutional experience or at least the potential to achieve significant results in our intended areas of work.

Counterpart then sent each CSO a questionnaire to collect additional information on their technical and administrative capacities, which included details on their senior/executive personnel, registration date, most notable accomplishments, human resources, membership in CSO coalitions, networks, partnerships and/or other social movements, geographic focus, average annual budget, major sources of funding, etc. (see Appendix 2: CSO Mapping Report for more details). At the end of December, a total of 20 CSOs had responded to the questionnaire. This response rate is directly attributable to the holiday season as many CSOs closed down for the last two weeks of December. It is anticipated that the response rate will increase significantly in January, once CSO return to operation.

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[9] These CSOs consisted of 40 NGOs/advocacy groups from across different thematic sectors, 3 think tanks and 1 private sector foundation.

The final mapping of CSOs resulting from this process will allow Counterpart to classify CSOs as *Leader* or *High Potential*[10] in accordance with standardized evaluation criteria that evaluates CSOs against five key areas and includes a weighted point system. These five evaluation criteria include:

1) Institutional experience on the implementation of good governance and accountability initiatives (for a total of 30 points);
2) Impact of implemented initiatives (for a total of 15 points);
3) Membership in coalitions/networks of likeminded CSOs (for a total of 25 points);
4) Administrative capacities (for a total of 20 points);
5) Visibility and references in media (traditional outlets and social media) (for a total of 10 points).

The maximum score each organization could receive is 100 points, according to the breakdown above. CSOs scoring 75 points or higher – which suggests vast technical expertise and medium to advanced administrative capacities – are categorized as Leader CSOs; while CSOs scoring between 30 to 74 points will be categorized as high potential CSOs. Counterpart will also categorize CSOs with a score of 29 points or less as Other CSOs, which include groups or movements that may not currently exist as legal entities, but that still enjoy high visibility and/or influence. For more detailed information regarding the CSO Mapping methodology and categorization, please see Attachment 2: CSO Mapping Report.

Initially, the information resulting from this process will assist the Project in determining the CSOs that will be invited to present applications under the first phase of our grant cycle process, which will focus on Leader CSOs. The CSO Mapping will also serve as a database to invite CSOs for future full and open competitions and to other Project activities (e.g. launch event, training sessions, etc.). The CSO Mapping will be finalized in January 2016.

1.1.b Selection of CSO Partners and Grantees
Counterpart will select grantees starting next quarter with the launch of its first grant cycle phase. However, in anticipation of implementation of Year 1 work plan activities, Counterpart held introductory meetings with two prospective grantees - on December 14 Counterpart met with the Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales (ICEFI) and on December 21 with Acción Ciudadana - to become further acquainted with each organization's transparency/anti-corruption work and identify priorities to build upon progress made to date by these organizations. Additionally, these meetings served to share with local CSOs some key aspects of our future grantee selection criteria, such as the ability to forge partnerships with emerging actors, work collaboratively with other CSOs, and extend their presence to the geographic focus of the Project. These encounters will continue early next quarter.

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[10] *Leader CSOs* are defined as those CSOs already achieving significant impact in the areas of transparency, anti-corruption and responsive governance. *High Potential CSOs*, on the other hand, are defined as those CSOs with significant potential for increasing their impact in the areas of interest to the Project.

1.1.b.1 Phase 1: Limited release RFA for Leader Organizations

In November, Counterpart submitted for USAID's approval the Project's proposed Grants Manual, which included a section for the Rapid Response Funds. To date, this manual is still under review with USAID.

1.1.b.2 Phase 2: Full and Open Competition

No actions were planned under this activity in Q1. Counterpart anticipates releasing a full and open competition in the fourth quarter of Year 1.

1.1.c Activity Grants

Counterpart anticipates releasing an initial RFA among Leader organization as established in Phase I of the Project's Work Plan. Counterpart anticipates awarding grants for the implementation of targeted activities and institutional strengthening in March 2016, subject to the timely approval from USAID.

1.1.c.1 Rapid Response Fund

This quarter, Counterpart incorporated into its proposed Grants Manual a special section outlining the purpose, eligibility criteria, and awarding procedures of a Rapid Response Fund (RRF) mechanism. To date, this manual is still under review and negotiation with USAID for final approvals.

1.1.c.2 Coordination and Cooperation with other USAID Initiatives and Other Donors

In coordination with USAID/Guatemala, Counterpart began holding introductory meetings with a number of USAID-implementing partners in Guatemala to better understand their geographic and programmatic scopes, establish the foundations for future coordination, and avoid the duplication of programmatic efforts. Meetings where held with Checchi's Security and Justice Sector Reform Project on December 9 and Mercy Corp's Community Strengthening Project on December 3. As a result, Counterpart collected the names and contact information of other prospective grantees, which were then incorporated into our CSO Mapping exercise and discussed the priorities to address corruption risks in Guatemala (for instance, at the municipal level where local authorities tend to act in an opaque and discretionary manner).

Additionally, Counterpart began drafting an initial directory of international donors likely involved in transparency/accountability initiatives in Guatemala. The Project intends to engage in conversation with these international donors early next quarter.

Project Objective Two: Strengthen Institutional and Technical Capacity of Targeted CSOs

Result 2.1 - Increased Numbers of CSOs Engaged in Transparency and Good Governance Issues with Increased Organizational Capacity

2.1.a Organizational Capacity Building
This activity will begin after CSO selection in QR2.

2.1.b Kick Off and Adapt the Diagnostic Tool
This quarter, Counterpart's field staff began reviewing Counterpart's Organizational Development (OD) framework and diagnostic tools to adapt it to the Guatemalan context and CSOs (ongoing process). The tool is anticipated to be finalized in the coming quarter.

2.1.c Conduct Participatory Organizational Development Assessments
This activity will begin after CSO selection in QR2.

2.1.d Development of Capacity-Building Action Plans
This activity will begin after the initial OD assessment in QR3.

2.1.e Determine Grant Budgets
This activity will begin after CSO selection in QR2.

Result 2.2 – Enhanced Coordination and Collaboration Among CSOs Engaged in Transparency and Good Governance, Particularly Spaces for Dialogue and Consensus Around Key Issues and Strategies

2.2.a Support for Coordination and Collaboration among CSOs
This activity will begin after the initial OD assessment in QR3.

2.2.b Provision of Training and Customized Technical Assistance
This activity will begin after the initial OD assessment in QR3.

2.2.c Maximizing Local Resources
This activity will begin after the initial OD assessment in QR3.

2.2.d Technical Training from IFES
This activity will begin after the initial OD assessment in QR3.

2.2.e Election Readiness
Counterpart did not schedule activities under this task in Q1.

2.2.f Furthering Sustainability through Peer-learning and Establishing Communities of Practice
Counterpart did not schedule activities under this task in Q1.

2.2.g Strengthening Financial Sustainability
This activity will begin after the initial OD assessment in QR3.

In Country Training and Other Events Performed During the Reporting Periods:

Counterpart did not schedule external training activities in Q1.

Documents Submitted During the Reporting Period to the Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC)

Counterpart will submit the Work Plan once approved and the Quarterly Report once finalized to the DEC. No other documents have been uploaded this quarter.

VI.   MONITORING AND EVALUATION

On December 4, the Program submitted its PMEP to USAID for approval. This included two associated instruments: a Performance Indicators Tracking Table (PITT) covering the Project's proposed targets for the entire implementation period and Performance Indicators Reference Sheets (PIRS), which provide detailed definitions and the scope of all proposed output and outcome indicators. USAID's comments to the PMEP are expected during the second quarter of the fiscal year.

VII.   ACHIEVEMENTS

Counterpart achieved the following results this quarter:

Startup: This first quarter of the Project's implementation was crucial to establishing Counterpart's presence in Guatemala, as it relates to the Civil Society for Accountable Governance Project. Counterpart began building relationships with its three implementing partners, as well as with other relevant CSOs and other USAID implementing partners. Counterpart also completed the relocation of its Chief of Party and the hiring of its core technical staff within five weeks of Cooperative Agreement signing. The Project was able set up operations at temporary facilities and complete the search for an alternate DCOP whose candidacy was submitted for USAID's review in December.

Institutional Analysis: As noted above, within a few weeks of Program launch, Counterpart completed a report that provides a baseline assessment for the public institutions that are most relevant for anti-corruption reform and provides a snapshot of potential political scenarios for 2016 that may shape the Project's implementation strategies in the month ahead. This type of baseline information is crucial to identifying potential allies in government and civil society, as well as to determining priority areas for Project involvement.

Fostering Initial Contacts with Prospective Grantees: Counterpart initiated contact with 44 prospective CSO grantees via direct meetings or written communications to gather information on their institutional experiences and administrative capacities.[11] This engagement was particularly important to initiate as early as possible in Q1 in order to start building a solid relationship with prospective grantees, communicate at an early stage the main focus of the future grants program, and to manage expectations in relation to the grant awards process. In this case, it was very relevant to communicate the competitive nature of our selection process and to encourage non-traditional USAID grantees to participate.

VIII. BEST PRACTICES AND CHALLENGES

Counterpart faced some challenges in collecting information from CSOs to develop the CSO Mapping Tool. Most CSOs suspended operations as of mid-December due to the holiday season, yet based on desk research and close communications with several organizations. Counterpart will complete this exercise by mid-January.

Recruitment continues to be a challenge for Counterpart and our partners as we endeavor to find qualified candidates for various open positions including the Project DCOP.

IX. PROGRAMMING PRIORITIES FOR NEXT QUARTER

The list below highlights some of the main programmatic priorities scheduled for the next quarter:

Complete CSO Mapping: Counterpart's initial work in Guatemala will be contingent upon the identification of suitable CSO partners across all geographical areas of this project. Counterpart's top priority at the beginning of next quarter will be to complete its CSO Mapping exercise. The two-fold purpose of this tool is to chart the universe of potential grantees with whom the program intends to establish long-term partnerships and classify them as Leader or High Potential CSOs based on their technical expertise and institutional capacities.

Continued Communications with CSOs: Counterpart will hold additional meetings with prospective grantees (e.g. FUNDESA, ASIES, Movimiento Pro Justicia and others) to introduce the Project, become further acquainted with their work, and collect information on the most pressing anti-corruption priorities.

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[11] In early January 2016, Counterpart identified and established contact with 17 additional CSOs increasing the list of potential grantees to 61.

Grants Manual Documentation: Counterpart will complete the translation of grant documentation into Spanish and address any comments on its proposed Grants Manual.

Limited Release RFA: Following the mapping exercise, the Project will implement a two-phased selection process for Project grantees. During the next quarter Counterpart will initiate the first phase of the grantee selection process, which involves issuing a limited-release RFA for Activity and Institutional Support Grants amongst the Leader CSOs identified in the Mapping exercise. This will allow the Project and the selected grantees to address targeted and time-sensitive issues shortly after the President-Elect assumes office.

Donor Transparency Roundtable: Starting next quarter, Counterpart plans to organize a "Transparency Round Table" with international donors and other USAID implementing partners to promote coordination and avoid duplication of efforts. In preparation of this activity, Counterpart will organize individual meetings with representatives of international donors and multilateral organizations (e.g. World Bank, UNDP, UNDOC, bilateral cooperation agencies, etc.). Counterpart intends to convene these Transparency Round Table sessions on a quarterly basis beginning next quarter.

Program launching event: Counterpart is also planning to hold the Project's launching ceremony in early March. This event will pursue three key objectives: 1) Raise the project's profile to a larger audience of CSO representatives, United States Government (USG) and Guatemalan government representatives, the international donor community and media; 2) Set the tone for transparent and open collaboration between civil society and the government in joint efforts to combat corruption; and 3) Introduce the Project's objectives. Subject to confirmation, the launching ceremony will feature the US Ambassador Todd Robinson and the local Ombudsman as keynote speakers. This event will provide the Project with the opportunity to underline the most pressing priorities to prevent, detect and/or penalize corruption in Guatemala.

Organizational Development: Counterpart will also begin training staff on its Organizational Development process as well as initiate the search for a local university or think tank that could eventually become a partner in institutionalizing Counterpart's Organizational Certification Process.

Program Website: Counterpart will prepare a draft structure and request quotations for the design of a Project website. This tool is intended to report on public activities and to make available to CSOs a range of basic capacity building tools and resources on-line.

Administrative/Operational tasks: On the administrative front, Counterpart intends to complete its staffing requirements with the hiring of all administrative support staff (e.g. drivers, bookkeepers/accountants and an administrative assistant) and the remaining members of the technical team (e.g. DCOP, Civil Society/Accountability Specialist). The Project aims to have all staff hired and settled in the Project's permanent office by early February.

X.   APPENDIXES

1.   Institutional Analysis Report
2.   CSO Mapping Report

Civil Society for Accountable Governance Project

Síntesis Ejecutiva
Informe Trimestral

Síntesis Ejecutiva

Civil Society for Accountable Governance and Citizen Security (CSAGCS)[12] es un proyecto de cinco años financiado por la Agencia de Estados Unidos de América para el Desarrollo Internacional (USAID – por sus siglas en inglés) bajo el marco del Convenio Global para el Fortalecimiento de la Sociedad Civil y Socios (GCSS-LWA). El objetivo principal del proyecto es fortalecer y desarrollar las capacidades de las Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil (OSC) en Guatemala para desempeñar un rol más eficaz en atender temas de transparencia, redición de cuentas y la problemática de corrupción en el país. El proyecto desarrollará la capacidad de la sociedad civil a través de dos objetivos complementarios y de mutuo sostén: Objetivo 1: Brindar apoyo a los esfuerzos de las OSCs seleccionadas en la promoción de un gobierno transparente y en el combate de la corrupción; y Objetivo 2: Fortalecer la capacidad técnica e institucional de las OSC seleccionadas.

El presente informe abarca el primer trimestre de implementación (octubre 2015 – diciembre de 2015) del año uno del proyecto. Durante este trimestre, Counterpart logró importantes resultados en lo relacionado a la puesta en marcha administrativa del proyecto, así como en cuanto a la presentación de productos claves y comenzar a forjar relaciones con socios y contrapartes potenciales. Estos resultados incluyen:

Inicio de operaciones
Este primer trimestre de ejecución del proyecto fue crucial para establecer la presencia de Counterpart en Guatemala, específicamente en lo relacionado al Proyecto. En relación a ello, Counterpart concentró una parte importante de sus esfuerzos en iniciar sus operaciones en el país, lo que abarcó: la reubicación de su Jefe de Equipo (Chief of Party -COP) y concluir la primera etapa del proceso de reclutamiento del personal del proyecto, establecer oficinas temporales, identificar una sede permanente, ampliar la búsqueda de un Sub – Jefe de Equipo (Deputy Chief of Party-DCOP) y presentar su candidatura a USAID. También se llevó a cabo el abordaje de los temas legales y administrativos para el inicio de operaciones del Proyecto en Guatemala.

Actividades de establecimiento de relaciones institucionales y/o coordinación de actividades
Counterpart continuó ampliando los lazos de colaboración con sus tres socios implementadores, quienes tienen sede en los Estados Unidos de América, a fin de desarrollar los productos iniciales del Proyecto y definir mecanismos de comunicaciones internas. Counterpart se reunió a la vez con Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil (OSC) y socios implementadores de USAID con sede en Guatemala a fin de procurar la futura implementación eficiente y eficaz del proyecto a través de la definición de bases para una futura coordinación y así evitar la duplicación de esfuerzos programáticos. Como resultado de estas reuniones, Counterpart obtuvo datos de contacto de otros posibles donatarios, que luego fueron incorporados al proceso de mapeo de OSC. El proyecto también recopiló información sobre algunas de las prioridades percibidas para mitigar riesgos de corrupción en Guatemala (por ejemplo, a nivel municipal donde las autoridades locales tienden a

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[12] De acuerdo a lo dispuesto por nuestro Convenio de Cooperación - El nombre de este proyecto es el de "*Civil Society for Accontable Governance and Citizen Security Project*" (CSAGCS). Como resultado de conversaciones sostenidas con USAID el 6 de noviembre de 2015, Counterpart solicitará una modificación formal de nuestro Convenio de Cooperación a fin de eliminar el término "Seguridad Ciudadana" del título de nuestro Proyecto

actuar de una manera opaca y discrecional), que a su vez sirvió para nutrir las actividades del plan de trabajo propuesto.

Mapeo de las OSC
A principios de diciembre, Counterpart inició un mapeo de las OSC (que abarca organizaciones no gubernamentales – ONG, fundaciones del sector privado, centros de pensamiento, universidades, medios de comunicación y otros) como paso preliminar para pre-identificar potenciales donatarios en las zonas de interés geográfico del proyecto (Ciudad de Guatemala, Villa Nueva, Mixco y Amatitlán). El proyecto identificó 44 OSCs durante el periodo cubierto por este informe (a la fecha de presentación de este informe, sin embargo, el 17 OSC adicionales fueron detectadas y contactadas) en base a: 1) la investigación inicial realizada durante la fase de preparación de la propuesta; 2) recomendaciones proporcionadas por USAID/Guatemala y de sus socios implementadores en la Oficina de Democracia y Gobernabilidad (DG); 3) trabajo de investigación en línea realizado por el equipo de Counterpart en Guatemala; 4) referencias de otras OSC; y 5) referencias del staff local.

Con posterioridad a su identificación, Counterpart remitió el 10 de diciembre a las 44 organizaciones un cuestionario a manera de recabar mayores datos sobre sus capacidades institucionales y recursos humanos (ver el Anexo 2 del Mapeo de OSC para mayores detalles). En un periodo de tres días hábiles, 20 de las 44 organizaciones respondieron a nuestra solicitud de información. [13]

El proceso de mapeo de las OSC permitirá a Countepart clasificar las organizaciones como *Líder* o *Alto potencial*, dos categorías que ayudarán a determinar el tipo y nivel de involucramiento de Counterpart con OSC. Las OSC serán evaluadas de acuerdo a los siguientes criterios: 1) experiencia institucional en la implementación de iniciativas en materia de gobernabilidad transparente y rendición de cuentas; 2) impacto de las iniciativas implementadas; 3) participación en coaliciones y redes de OSC con ideas afines; 4) capacidad administrativa; 5) visibilidad y referencias en medios de comunicación tradicionales y redes sociales. A cada uno de estos aspectos se le dio una ponderación específica para una calificación total posible de 100 puntos (ver Anexo 2 con una muestra de la hoja de evaluación empleada).

Counterpart define a las OSC *líderes* como aquellas OSC que han logrado un impacto significativo en las áreas de transparencia, lucha contra la corrupción y/o gobernabilidad. Por otra parte, las OSC con *Alto Potencial* se definen como aquellas OSC con un gran potencial para ampliar su impacto en las áreas de interés del proyecto.

Resultados programáticos iniciales
Hacia finales de noviembre y principios de diciembre de 2015, Counterpart presentó a consideración de USAID los siguientes documentos: Plan Anual de Trabajo, Estrategia de Equidad de Género, Manual de Donaciones, Plan de Monitoreo y Evaluación y Estrategia de Desarrollo de Marca y Plan de Marcado. Hasta la fecha, estos documentos se encuentran todavía bajo revisión.

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[13] Aunque la tasa de respuesta fue baja, en virtud del poco tiempo previo al periodo vacacional de diciembre, las 20 respuestas recibidas excedieron expectativas. A la fecha se han recibido 35 respuestas. La solicitud de propuestas inicial no será distribuida sino hasta inicios de febrero lo que dará mayor tiempo de recibir otras respuestas.

Counterpart también inició la adaptación y traducción al español de varios documentos anexos al Manual de Donaciones como medida previa a la expedición anticipada de su solicitud de propuestas (RFA- por sus siglas en inglés).

Análisis institucional
Countepart llevó a cabo un análisis institucional para ampliar el entendimiento del actual contexto institucional, político y social en Guatemala, particularmente en cuanto a los escenarios posibles de trabajo en el ámbito de un nuevo gobierno. El contexto político inesperado que se presentó en gran parte en el año 2015, especialmente en el tema de corrupción dentro del gobierno, llevó a movilizar una ciudadanía que protestó *masivamente* contra la corrupción y la impunidad. Dado que las instituciones públicas fueron criticadas ampliamente durante esos eventos, el informe de análisis institucional hizo un repaso de cada una de las instituciones clave para reformar el estado. El análisis también identifica posibles oportunidades y los riesgos que pueden surgir en el 2016 en relación con la implementación de las actividades del proyecto.